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Abstract
In many social situations, a discrepancy arises between an individual’s private and expressed opinions on a given topic.
Motivated by Solomon Asch’s seminal experiments on social conformity and other related socio-psychological works, we
propose a novel opinion dynamics model to study how such a discrepancy can arise in general social networks of interpersonal
influence. Each individual in the network has both a private and an expressed opinion: an individual’s private opinion evolves
under social influence from the expressed opinions of the individual’s neighbours, while the individual determines his or her
expressed opinion under a pressure to conform to the average expressed opinion of his or her neighbours, termed the local
public opinion. General conditions on the network that guarantee exponentially fast convergence of the opinions to a limit are
obtained. Further analysis of the limit yields several semi-quantitative conclusions, which have insightful social interpretations,
including the establishing of conditions that ensure every individual in the network has such a discrepancy. Last, we show the
generality and validity of the model by using it to explain and predict the results of Solomon Asch’s seminal experiments.
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1 Introduction
The study of dynamic models of opinion evolution on
social networks has recently become of interest to the
systems and control community. Most models are agent-
based, in which the opinion(s) of each individual (agent)
evolve via interaction and communication with neigh-
bouring individuals. This paper aims to develop a novel
opinion dynamics model as a general theoretical frame-
work to study how discrepancies arise in individuals’ pri-
vate and expressed opinions, and thus bridge the current
gap between socio-psychological studies on conformity
and dynamic models of interpersonal influence. Inter-
ested readers are referred to [1,2,3] for surveys on the
many works on opinion dynamics models.
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Discrepancies in private and expressed opinions of in-
dividuals can arise in many situations, with a variety
of consequential phenomena. Over one third of jurors
in criminal trials would have privately voted against
the final decision of their jury [4]. Large differences be-
tween a population’s private and expressed opinions can
create discontent and tension, a factor associated with
the Arab Spring movement [5] and the fall of the So-
viet Union [6]. Access to the public action of individu-
als, without being able to observe their thoughts, can
create informational cascades where all subsequent in-
dividuals select the wrong action [7]. Other phenom-
ena linked to such discrepancies include pluralistic igno-
rance, where individuals privately reject a view but be-
lieve the majority of other individuals accept it [8], the
“spiral of silence” [9,10], and enforcement of unpopular
social norms [11,12]. Whether occurring in a jury panel,
a company boardroom or in the general population for
a sensitive political issue, the potential societal ramifi-
cations of large and persistent discrepancies in private
and expressed opinions are clear, and serve as a key mo-
tivator for our investigations.
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1.1 Existing Work
Conformity: Empirical Data and Static Models. One
common reason such discrepancies arise is a pressure on
an individual to conform in a group situation; formal
study of such phenomena goes back over six decades.
In 1951, Solomon E. Asch’s seminal paper [13] showed
an individual’s public support for an indisputable fact
could be distorted due to the pressure to conform to a
unanimous group of others opposing this fact. Asch’s
work was among the many studies examining the ef-
fects of pressures to conform to the group standard or
opinion, using both controlled laboratory experiments
and data gathered from field studies. Many of the lab
experiments focus on Asch-like studies, perhaps with
various modifications. A meta-analysis of 125 such
studies was presented in [14]. Pluralistic ignorance is
often associated with pressures to conform to social
norms [8,15,16]. With a focus on the seminal Asch ex-
periments, a number of static models were proposed to
describe a single individual conforming to a unanimous
majority [17,18,19], with obvious common limitations
in generalisation to dynamics on social networks.
Opinion Dynamics Models. Agent-based models
(ABMs) have proved to be both versatile and powerful,
with simple agent-level dynamics leading to interesting
emergent network-level social phenomena. The seminal
French–DeGroot model [20,21] showed that a network
of individuals can reach a consensus of opinions via
weighted averaging of their opinions, a mechanism mod-
elling “social influence”. Indeed, the term “influence
network” arose to reflect the social influence exerted via
the interpersonal network. Since then, the roles of ho-
mophily [22,23], bias assimilation [24], social distancing
[25], and antagonistic interactions [26,27] in generating
clustering, polarisation, and disagreement of opinions in
the social network have also been studied. Individuals
who remain somewhat attached to their initial opin-
ions were introduced in the Friedkin–Johnsen model
[28] to explain the persistent disagreements observed in
real communities. However, a key assumption in most
existing ABMs (including those above), is that each
individual has a single opinion for a given topic. These
models are unable to capture phenomena in which an
individual holds, for the same topic, a private opinion
different to the opinion he or she expresses.
A few complex ABMs do exist in which each agent has
both an expressed opinion and a private opinion for the
same topic. The work [11] studies norm enforcement and
assumes that each agent has two binary variables rep-
resenting private and public acceptance or rejection of
a norm. We are motivated to consider opinions as con-
tinuous variables to better capture discrepancies in ex-
pressed and private opinions, since an individual’s opin-
ion may range in its intensity. The model in [29] does as-
sume the expressed and private opinions take values in a
continuous interval, but is extremely complex and non-
linear. The properties of the models in [11,29] have only
been partially characterised by simulation-based analy-
sis, which is computationally expensive if detailed anal-
ysis is desired.
We seek to expand from [11,29] to build an ABM of lower
complexity that is still powerful enough to capture how
discrepancies in expressed and private opinions might
evolve in social networks, and to allow study by theoret-
ical analysis, as opposed to only by simulation. Impor-
tantly also, a minimal number of parameters per agent
makes data fitting and parameter estimation in experi-
mental investigations a tractable process, as highlighted
by the successful validations of the Friedkin–Johnsen
model [30,31,32], whereas experiments for more compli-
cated models are rare.
1.2 Contributions of This Paper
In this paper, we aim to bridge the gap between the liter-
ature on conformity and the opinion dynamics models,
by proposing a model where each individual (agent) has
both a private and an expressed opinion. Inspired by the
Friedkin–Johnsen model, we propose that an individ-
ual’s private opinion evolves under social influence ex-
erted by the individual’s network neighbours’ expressed
opinions, but each individual remains attached to his or
her initial opinion with a level of stubbornness. Then,
and motivated by existing works on the pressures to con-
form in a group situation, we propose that each individ-
ual has some resilience to this pressure, and each individ-
ual expresses an opinion altered from his or her private
opinion to be closer to the average expressed opinion.
Rigorous analysis of the model is given, leading to a
number of semi-quantitative conclusions with insightful
social interpretations. We show that for strongly con-
nected networks and almost all parameter values for
stubbornness and resilience, individuals’ opinions con-
verge exponentially fast to a steady-state of persistent
disagreement. We identify that the combination of (i)
stubbornness, (ii) resilience, and (iii) connectivity of the
network generically leads to every individual having a
discrepancy between his or her limiting expressed and
private opinions. We give a method for underbounding
the disagreement among the limiting private opinions
given limited knowledge of the network, and show that a
change in an individual’s resilience to the pressure has a
propagating effect on every other individual’s expressed
opinion. Last, we apply our model to the seminal experi-
ments on conformity by Asch [13]. Asch recorded 3 differ-
ent types of responses among test individuals who must
choose between expressing support for an indisputable
fact and siding with a unanimous majority claiming the
fact to be false. We identify stubbornness and resilience
parameter ranges for all 3 responses; this capturing of
all 3 responses is a first among ABMs, and underlines
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our model’s strength as a general framework for study-
ing the evolution of expressed and private opinions.
Our work extends from (i) the static models of confor-
mity, by generalising to opinion dynamics on arbitrary
networks, and (ii) the dynamic agent-based models, by
introducing mechanisms inspired by socio-psychological
literature to model the expressed and private opinions of
each individual separately. The result is a general mod-
elling framework, which is shown to be consistent with
empirical data, and may be used to further the study
of phenomena involving discrepancies in private and ex-
pressed opinions in social networks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The model
is presented in Section 2, with theoretical results detailed
in Section 3. Section 4 applies the model to Asch’s ex-
periments, with concluding remarks given in Section 5.
2 A Novel Model of Opinion Evolution Under
Pressure to Conform
Before introducing the model, we define some notation,
and introduce graphs, which are used to model the net-
work of interpersonal influence.
Notations: The n-column vector of all ones and zeros
is given by 1n and 0n respectively. The n × n identity
matrix is given by In. For a matrix A ∈ Rn×m (respec-
tively a vector a ∈ Rn), we denote the (i, j)th element
as aij (respectively the i
th element as ai). A matrix A
is said to be nonnegative, denoted by A ≥ 0 (respec-
tively positive, denoted by A > 0) if all of its entries
aij are nonnegative (respectively positive). A nonnega-
tive matrix A is said to be row-stochastic (respectively
row-substochastic) if for all i, there holds
∑n
j=1 aij = 1
(respectively
∑n
j=1 aij ≤ 1 and ∃k :
∑n
j=1 akj < 1).
Graphs: Given any nonnegative not necessarily symmet-
ric A ∈ Rn×n, we can associate with it a graph G[A] =
(V, E [A],A). Here, V = {v1, . . . , vn} is the set of nodes,
with index set I = {1, . . . , n}. An edge eij = (vi, vj) is
in the set of ordered edges E [A] ⊆ V × V if and only if
aji > 0. The edge eij is said to be incoming with respect
to j and outgoing with respect to i. We allow self-loops,
i.e. eii is allowed to be in E . The neighbour set of vi is de-
noted by Ni = {vj ∈ V : (vj , vi) ∈ E}. A directed path
is a sequence of edges of the form (vp1 , vp2), (vp2 , vp3), ...,
where vpi ∈ V, epjpk ∈ E . A graph G[A] is strongly con-
nected if and only if there is a path from every node to
every other node [33], or equivalently, if and only if A
is irreducible [33]. A cycle is a directed path that starts
and ends at the same vertex, and contains no repeated
vertex except the initial (also the final) vertex, and a di-
rected graph is aperiodic if there exists no integer k > 1
that divides the length of every cycle of the graph [34].
We are now ready to propose the agent-based model. For
a population of n individuals, let yi(t) ∈ R and yˆi(t) ∈ R,
i = 1, . . . , n, represent, at time t = 0, 1, . . ., individual i’s
private and expressed opinions on a given topic, respec-
tively. In general, yi(t) and yˆi(t) are not the same, and
we regard yi as individual i’s true opinion. Individual i
may refrain from expressing yi(t) for many reasons, e.g.
political correctness when discussing a sensitive topic.
For instance, preference falsification [35] occurs when an
individual falsifies his or her view due to social pressure
(be it imaginary or real), or deliberately, e.g. by a politi-
cian seeking to garner votes. In our model, an individual
falsifies his or her opinion due to a pressure to conform
to the group average opinion. The terms “opinion”, “be-
lief”, and “attitude” all appear in the literature, with
various related definitions Our model is general enough
to cover all these terms, since in all such instances, one
can scale yi(t), yˆi(t) to be in some real interval [a, b],
where a and b represent the two extreme positions on the
topic. For consistency, we will only use “opinion” unless
explicitly stated otherwise.
The individuals discuss their expressed opinions yˆi(t)
over a network described by a graph G[W ], and as a
result, their private and expressed opinions, yi(t) and
yˆi(t) evolve in a process qualitatively described in Fig. 1.
Formally, individual i’s private opinion evolves as
yi(t+1) = λiwiiyi(t)+λi
n∑
j 6=i
wij yˆj(t)+(1−λi)yi(0) (1)
and expressed opinion yˆi(t) is determined according to
yˆi(t) = φiyi(t) + (1− φi)yˆi,lavg(t− 1). (2)
In Eq. (1), the influence weight that individual i ac-
cords to individual j’s expressed opinion yˆj(t) is cap-
tured by wij ≥ 0, satisfying
∑n
j=1 wij = 1 for all i ∈ I.
The term wii ≥ 0 represents the self-confidence (if any)
of individual i in i’s own private opinion 1 . The con-
stant λi ∈ [0, 1] represents individual i’s susceptibility
to interpersonal influence changing i’s private opinion
(1 − λi is thus i’s stubbornness regarding initial opin-
ion yi(0)). Individual i is maximally or minimally sus-
ceptible if λi = 1 or λi = 0, respectively. In Eq. (2),
the quantity yˆi,lavg(t) =
∑
j∈Ni mij yˆi(t) is specific to in-
dividual i, and includes only the expressed yˆj(t) of i’s
neighbours. We assume that the weight mij ≥ 0 satis-
fies wij > 0 ⇔ mij > 0 and
∑
j∈Ni mij = 1; the ma-
trix M = {mij} is therefore row-stochastic and G[M ]
has the same connectivity properties as G[W ]. A nat-
ural choice is mij = |Ni|−1 for all j : eji ∈ E [W ],
1 In most situations, one can assume wii > 0, and models
for studying the dynamics of wii exist [36,37]. Presence of
wii > 0 can also ensure convergence of the opinions, e.g. in
the DeGroot model [1].
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while a reasonable alternative is mij = wij ,∀i, j ∈ I.
Thus, yˆi,lavg(t) represents the group standard or norm
as viewed by individual i at time t, and is termed the lo-
cal public opinion as perceived by individual i. The con-
stant φi ∈ [0, 1] encodes individual i’s resilience to pres-
sures to conform to the local public opinion (maximally
1, and minimally 0), or resilience for short. The initial
expressed opinion is set to be yˆi(0) = yi(0), which means
Eq. (1) comes into effect for t = 1. As it turns out, under
mild assumptions on λi, the final opinion values are de-
pendent on yi(0) but independent of yˆi(0); one could also
select other initialisations for yˆi(0) with the final opin-
ions unchanged (though the transient would change).
Sociology literature indicates that the pressure to con-
form causes an individual to express an opinion that is in
the direction of the perceived group standard [13,38,10],
which in our model is yˆi,lavg(t). Some pressures of con-
formity may derive from unspoken traditions [39], or a
fear or being different [13], and others arise because of a
desire to be in the group, driven by e.g. monetary incen-
tives, status or rewards [40]. Thus, Eq. (2) aims to cap-
ture individual i expressing an opinion equal to i’s pri-
vate opinion modified or altered due to normative pres-
sure (proportional to 1 − φi) to be closer to the pub-
lic opinion as perceived by individual i, which exerts a
“force” (1− φi)yˆi,lavg(t− 1). Heterogeneous φi captures
the fact that some individuals are less inhibited/reserved
than others when expressing their opinions. In addition,
pressures are exerted (or perceived to be exerted), dif-
ferentially for individuals, e.g. due to status [41,38].
Remark 1 Use of a local public opinion yˆi,lavg(t) en-
sures the model’s scalability to large networks, but in
small networks, e.g. a boardroom of 10 people, one could
replace yˆi,lavg(t) with the global public opinion yˆavg(t) =
1
n
∑n
j=1 yˆj(t) since it is likely to be discernible to every
individual. It turns out that all but one of the high-level
theoretical conclusions, including convergence, do not de-
pend on the choice of weights of the local public opinion,
nor on whether a local or global public opinion is used.
However, preliminary observations show that the distri-
bution of the final opinion values can vary significantly
depending on the aforementioned choices, and we leave
characterisation of the difference to future investigations.
Remark 2 A key feature in our model, departing from
most existing models, is the associating of two states yi, yˆi
for each individual and the restriction that only other yˆj
(and no yj) may be available to individual i. Importantly,
note that yˆi(t) evolves dynamically via Eq. (2); yˆi(t) is not
simply an output variable. However, notice that setting
φi = 1 for all i recovers the Friedkin–Johnsen model,
while φi = λi = 1 for all i, recovers the DeGroot model
[21]. One may also notice the time-shift in Eq. (2) of
yˆi,lavg(t−1), which ensures that Eq. (2) is consistent with
the qualitative process described in Fig. 1. Thus, Eq. (2)
aims to capture a natural manner, widely supported in the
Fig. 1. The discussion process. Each individual i, at time
step t, expresses opinion yˆi(t) and learns of others’ expressed
opinions yˆj(t), j 6= i. Next, the privately held opinion yi(t+1)
evolves according to Eq. (1). After this, individual i then
determines the new yˆi(t + 1) to be expressed in the next
round of discussion, according to Eq. (2).
sociology literature, in which an individual determines
his or her expressed opinion under a pressure to conform.
2.1 The Networked System Dynamics
We now obtain a matrix form equation for the dynam-
ics of all individuals’ opinions on the network. Let y =
[y1, y2, . . . , yn]
> and yˆ = [yˆ1, yˆ2, . . . , yˆn]> be the stacked
vectors of private and expressed opinions yi and yˆi of the
n individuals in the influence network, respectively. The
influence matrixW can be decomposed asW = W˜+Ŵ
where W˜ is a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries
w˜ii = wii. The matrix Ŵ has entries ŵij = wij for
all j 6= i and ŵii = 0 for all i. Define Λ = diag(λi)
and Φ = diag(φi). Substituting yˆj(t) from Eq. (2) into
Eq. (1), and recalling that yˆi,lavg =
∑
j∈Nj mij yˆj , yields
yi(t+ 1)=λiwiiyi(t) + λi
n∑
j 6=i
wijφjyj(t)+ (1− λi)yi(0)
+ λi
n∑
j 6=i
wij(1− φj)
∑
k∈Nj
mjkyˆk(t− 1).
(3)
From Eq. (3) and Eq. (2), one obtains
[
y(t+ 1)
yˆ(t)
]
= P
[
y(t)
yˆ(t− 1)
]
+
[
(In −Λ)y(0)
0n
]
, (4)
where P consists of the following block matrices[
Λ(W˜ + ŴΦ) ΛŴ (In −Φ)M
Φ (In −Φ)M
]
=
[
P 11 P 12
P 21 P 22
]
(5)
As stated above, we set the initialisation as yˆ(0) = y(0),
yielding y(1) = (ΛW + In −Λ)y(0).
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3 Analysis of the Opinion Dynamical System
We now investigate the evolution of yi(t) and yˆi(t), ac-
cording to Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), for the n individuals inter-
acting on the influence network G[W ]. In order to place
the focus on social interpretations, we first present the
theoretical statements, and then discuss conclusions. All
the proofs are deferred to the Appendix, since the key
focus of this section is to secure conclusions via analysis
of Eq. (4) regarding the discrepancies between expressed
and private opinions that form over time. Throughout
this section, we make the following assumption on the
social network.
Assumption 1 The network G[W ] is strongly con-
nected and aperiodic, and W is row-stochastic. Further-
more, there holds λi, φi ∈ (0, 1),∀ i ∈ I.
It should be noted that for the purpose of convergence
analysis, almost certainly one could relax the assumption
to include graphs which are not strongly connected, and
for φi, λi ∈ [0, 1], which we leave for future work.
Notice that because
∑n
j=1 wij = 1 and λi ∈ [0, 1], Eq. (1)
indicates that yi(t+ 1) is a convex combination of yi(0),
yi(t), and yˆj(t), j ∈ Ni. Similarly, yˆi(t) is a convex com-
bination of yi(t) and yˆi,lavg(t− 1). It follows that
S = {yi, yˆi : min
k∈I
yk(0) ≤ yi, yˆi ≤ max
j∈I
yj(0), i ∈ I} (6)
is a positive invariant set of the system Eq. (4), which
is a desirable property. If yi(0) ∈ [a, b], where a, b ∈ R
represent the two extremes of the opinion spectrum, and
S is a positive invariant set of Eq. (4), then the opinions
are always well defined.
3.1 Convergence
The main convergence theorem, and a subsequent corol-
lary for consensus, are now presented.
Theorem 1 (Exponential Convergence) Consider
a network G[W ] where each individual i’s opinions yi(t)
and yˆi(t) evolve according to Eq. (1) and Eq. (2), respec-
tively. Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, the system
Eq. (4) converges exponentially fast to the limit
lim
t→∞y(t) , y
∗ = Ry(0) (7)
lim
t→∞ yˆ(t) , yˆ
∗ = Sy∗, (8)
where R = (In − (P 11 + P 12S))−1(In − Λ) and S =
(In − P 22)−1P 21 are positive and row-stochastic, with
P ij defined in Eq. (5).
The above shows that the final private and expressed
opinions depend on y(0), while yˆ(0) are forgotten ex-
ponentially fast; one could initialise yˆ(0) arbitrarily,
though the transient will differ. The row-stochasticity
of R and S implies that the final private and expressed
opinions are a convex combination of the initial private
opinions. Additionally, R,S > 0 means every individ-
ual i’s initial yi(0) has an influence on every individual
j’s final opinions y∗j and yˆ
∗
j , a reflection of the strongly
connected network. The following corollary establishes
a condition for consensus of opinions, though one notes
that part of the hypothesis for Theorem 1 is discarded.
Corollary 1 (Consensus of Opinions) Suppose that
φi ∈ (0, 1), and λi = 1, for all i ∈ I. Suppose further that
G[W ] is strongly connected and aperiodic, andW is row-
stochastic. Then, for the system Eq. (4), limt→∞ y(t) =
limt→∞ yˆ(t) = α1n for some α ∈ R, exponentially fast.
3.2 Discrepancies and Persistent Disagreement
This section establishes how disagreement among the
opinions at steady state may arise. In the following theo-
rem, let zmax , maxi=1,...,n zi and zmin , mini=1,...,n zi
denote the largest and smallest element of z ∈ Rn.
Theorem 2 Suppose that the hypotheses in Theorem 1
hold. If y(0) 6= α1n for some α ∈ R, then the final
opinions obey the following inequalities
y(0)max > y
∗
max > yˆ
∗
max (9a)
y(0)min < y
∗
min < yˆ
∗
min (9b)
and yˆ∗min 6= yˆ∗max. Moreover, given a network G[W ]
and parameter vectors φ = [φ1, . . . , φn]
> and λ =
[λ1, . . . , λn]
>, the set of initial conditions y(0) for which
precisely m > 0 individuals ij ∈ {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ I have
y∗ij = yˆ
∗
ij
, i.e. m , |{i ∈ I : y∗i = yˆ∗i }|, lies in a subspace
of Rn with dimension n−m.
This result shows that for generic initial conditions
there is a persistent disagreement of final opinions at the
steady-state. This is a consequence of individuals not
being maximally susceptible to influence, λi < 1 ∀ i ∈ I.
One of the key conclusions of this paper is that for
any individual i in the network, y∗i 6= yˆ∗i for generic
initial conditions, which is a subtle but significant dif-
ference from Eq. (9). More precisely, the presence of both
stubbornness and pressure to conform, and the strong
connectedness of the network creates a discrepancy be-
tween the private and expressed opinions of an individ-
ual. Without stubbornness (λi = 1,∀ i), a consensus of
opinions is reached, and without a pressure to conform
(φi = 1), an individual has the same private and ex-
pressed opinions. Without strong connectedness, some
individuals will not be influenced to change opinions.
One further consequence of Eq. (9) is that y∗max−y∗min >
yˆ∗max− yˆ∗min, which implies that the level of agreement is
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greater among the final expressed opinions when com-
pared to the final private opinions. In other words, indi-
viduals are more willing to agree with others when they
are expressing their opinions in a social network due to
a pressure to conform. Moreover, the extreme final ex-
pressed opinions are upper and lower bounded by the
final private opinions, which are in turn upper and lower
bounded by the extreme initial private opinions, show-
ing the effects of interpersonal influence and a pressure
to conform.
Remark 3 Theorem 2 states that generically, there will
be no two individuals who have the same final private
opinions, and no individual will have the same final pri-
vate and expressed opinion. Let the parameters defin-
ing the system (W , φ and λ) be given and suppose that
one runs p experiments with yi(0) sampled independently
from a distribution (uniform, normal, beta, etc.) over a
non-degenerate interval 2 . If q is the number of those ex-
periments which result in y∗i = yˆ
∗
i for some i ∈ I, then
limp→∞ q/p = 0. From yet another perspective, the set
of y(0) for which y∗i = yˆ
∗
i for some i ∈ I belongs in a
subspace of Rn that has a Lebesgue measure of zero. Sim-
ilarly, y∗i = y
∗
j for i 6= j generically.
3.3 Estimating Disagreement in the Private Opinions
We now give a quantitative method for underbounding
the disagreement in the steady-state private opinions
for a special case of the model, where we replace the
local public opinion yˆi,lavg with the global public opinion
yˆavg = n
−1∑n
j=1 yˆi in Eq. (2) for all individuals.
Corollary 2 Suppose that, for all i ∈ I, yˆi,lavg(t− 1) in
Eq. (2) is replaced with yˆavg = n
−1∑n
j=1 yˆi. Let κ(φ) =
1 − φminφmax (1 − φmax) ∈ (0, 1) and φmax = maxi∈I φi,
φmin = mini∈I φi. Suppose further that the hypotheses in
Theorem 1 hold. Then,
yˆ∗max − yˆ∗min
κ(φ)
≤ y∗max − y∗min. (10)
For the purposes of monitoring the level of unvoiced dis-
content in a network (e.g. to prevent drastic and un-
foreseen actions or violence [5,6,29]), it is of interest to
obtain more knowledge about the level of disagreement
among the private opinions: y∗max−y∗min. A fundamental
issue is that such information is by definition unlikely to
be obtainable (except in certain situations like the post-
experimental interviews conducted by Asch in his exper-
iments, see Section 4). On the other hand, one expects
that the level of expressed disagreement yˆ∗max−yˆ∗min may
2 A statistical distribution is degenerate if for some k0 the
cumulative distribution function F (x, k0) = 0 if x < k0 and
F (x, k0) = 1 if x ≥ k0.
be available. While one cannot expect to know every φi,
we argue that φmax and φmin might be obtained, if not
accurately then approximately. If the global public opin-
ion yˆavg acts on all individuals, then Corollary 2 gives
a method for computing a lower bound on the level of
private disagreement given some limited knowledge.
It is obvious that if κ(φ) is small (if φmax is small and the
ratio φmin/φmax is close to 1), then even strong agree-
ment among the expressed opinions (a small yˆ∗max−yˆ∗min)
does not preclude significant disagreement in the final
private opinions of the individuals. This might occur in
e.g., an authoritarian government. The tightness of the
bound Eq. (10) depends on the ratio φmin/φmax; the
closer the ratio is to one (i.e. as the “force” of the pres-
sure to conform felt by each individual becomes more
uniform), the tighter the bound.
3.4 An Individual’s Resilience Affects Everyone
An interesting result is now presented, that shows how
individual i’s resilience φi is propagated through the net-
work.
Corollary 3 Suppose that the hypotheses in Theorem 1
hold. Then, the matrix S in Eq. (8) has partial derivative
∂(S)
∂φi
with strictly positive entries in the ith column and
with all other entries strictly negative.
Recall below Theorem 1 that individual k’s final ex-
pressed opinion yˆ∗k is a convex combination of all indi-
viduals’ final private opinions y∗j , with convex weights
skj , j = 1, . . . , n. Intuitively, increasing φk makes indi-
vidual k more resilient to the pressure to conform, and
this is confirmed by the above; ∂skk∂φk > 0 and
∂skj
∂φk
< 0
for any j 6= k and thus yˆ∗k → y∗k as φk → 1.
More importantly, the above result yields a surprising
and nontrivial fact; every entry of the kth column of
∂(S)
∂φk
is strictly positive, and all other entries of ∂(S)∂φk are
strictly negative. In context, any change in individual k’s
resilience directly impacts every other individual’s final
expressed opinion due to the network of interpersonal
influences. In particular, as φk increases (decreases), an
individual j’s final expressed opinion yˆ∗j becomes closer
to (further from) the final private opinion y∗k of individ-
ual k, since
∂sjk
∂φk
> 0 (decreasing, since
∂sjk
∂φk
< 0).
3.5 Simulations
Two simulations are now presented to illustrate the the-
oretical results. A 3-regular network 3 G[W ] with n = 18
3 A k-regular graph is one which every node vi has k neigh-
bours, i.e. |Ni| = k ∀ i ∈ I.
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is generated. Self-loops are added to each node (to en-
sure G[W ] is aperiodic), and the influence weights wij
are obtained as follows. The value of each wij is drawn
randomly from a uniform distribution in the interval
(0, 1) if (vj , vi) ∈ E , and once all wij are determined, the
weights are normalised by dividing all entries in row i
by
∑n
j=1 wij . This ensures thatW is row-stochastic and
nonnegative. For i 6= j, it is not required that wij = wji
(which would result in an undirected graph), but for sim-
plicity and convenience the simulations impose 4 that
wij > 0 ⇔ wji > 0. The values of yi(0), φi, and λi, are
selected from beta distributions, which have two param-
eters α and β. For α, β > 1, a beta distribution of the
variable x is unimodal and satisfies x ∈ (0, 1), which is
precisely what is required to satisfy Assumption 1 re-
garding φi, λi. The beta distribution parameters are (i)
α = 2, β = 2 for yi(0), (ii) α = 2, β = 2 for φi, and (iii)
α = 2, β = 8 for λi. In the simulation, we use the global
public opinion model (see Remark 1) to also showcase
Corollary 2.
The temporal evolution of opinions is shown in Fig. 2.
Several of the results detailed in this section can be ob-
served. In particular, it is clear that Eq. (8) holds. That
is, there is no consensus of the limiting expressed or pri-
vate opinions. Moreover, the disagreement among the
final expressed opinions, yˆ∗max − yˆ∗min, is strictly smaller
than the disagreement among the final private opinions,
y∗max − y∗min. Separate to this, the final private opinions
enclose the final expressed opinions from above and be-
low. For the given simulation, the largest and smallest
resilience values are φmax = 0.9437 and φmin = 0.1994,
respectively. This implies that κ(φ) = 0.9881. One can
also obtain that yˆ∗max − yˆ∗min = 0.1613. From Eq. (10),
this indicates that y∗max − y∗min ≥ 0.163. The simula-
tion result is consistent with the lower bound, in that
y∗max−y∗min = 0.3455. Also, the bound is not tight, since
φmin/φmax is far from 1 (see Section 3.3).
For the same G[W ], with the same initial conditions
yi(0) and resilience φi, a second simulation is run with
λ1 = 1,∀i ∈ I. As shown in Fig. 3, the opinions converge
to a consensus y∗ = yˆ∗ = α1n, for some α ∈ R, which
illustrates Corollary 1.
4 Application to Asch’s Experiments
We now use the model to revisit Solomon E. Asch’s sem-
inal experiments on conformity [13]. There are at least
two objectives. For one, successfully capturing Asch’s
empirical data constitutes a form of soft validation for
the model. Second, we aim to identify the values of the
4 Such an assumption is not needed for the theoretical re-
sults, but is a simple way to ensure that all directed graphs
generated using the MATLAB package are strongly con-
nected.
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Fig. 2. Temporal evolution of opinions for 18 individuals in
an influence network. The green and dotted blue lines rep-
resent the expressed and private opinions of the individuals,
respectively.
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Fig. 3. Temporal evolution of opinions for 18 individuals in
an influence network. The green and dotted blue lines rep-
resent the expressed and private opinions of the individuals,
respectively. The lack of stubbornness, λi = 1, ∀ i, means
that all opinions reach a consensus.
individual’s susceptibility λi and resilience φi that de-
termine the individual’s reaction to a unanimous major-
ity’s pressure to conform, and thus give an agent-based
model explanation of the recorded observations. In or-
der for the reader to fully appreciate and understand the
results, a brief overview of the experiments and its re-
sults are now given, and the reader is referred to [13] for
full details on the results. In summary, the experiments
studied an individual’s response to “two contradictory
and irreconcilable forces” [13] of (i) a clear and indis-
putable fact, and (ii) a unanimous majority of the others
who take positions opposing this fact.
In the experiment, eight individuals are instructed to
judge a series of line lengths. Of the eight individuals,
one is in fact the test subject, and the other seven “con-
federates” 5 have been told a priori about what they
5 These other individuals have become referred to as “con-
federates” in later literature.
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Fig. 4. Example of the Asch experiment. The individuals
openly discuss their individual beliefs as to which one of
A,B,C has the same length as the green line. Clearly A is
equal in length to the green line. The test individual is the
red node. The confederates (seven blue nodes) unanimously
express belief in the same wrong answer, e.g. B.
should do. An example of the line length judging experi-
ment is shown in Fig. 4. There are three lines of unequal
length, and the group has open discussions concerning
which one of the lines A,B,C is equal in length to the
green line. Each individual is required to independently
declare his choice, and the confederates (blue individ-
uals) unanimously select the same wrong answer, e.g.
B. The reactions of the test individual (red node) are
then recorded, followed by a post-experiment interview
to evaluate the test individual’s private belief 6 .
In order to apply our model, and with Fig. 4 as an il-
lustrative example, we frame yi, yˆi ∈ [0, 1] to be indi-
vidual i’s belief in the statement “the green line is of
the same length as line A.” Specifically, yi = 1 (respec-
tively yi = 0) implies individual i is maximally certain
the statement is true (respectively, maximally certain
the statement is false). Asch found close to 100% of indi-
viduals in control groups had yi(0) = 1. Without loss of
generality, we therefore denote the test individual as in-
dividual 1 and set y1(0) = yˆ(0) = 1. Confederates are set
to have yi(0) = yˆi(0) = 0, for i = 2, . . . , n, with λi = 0
and φi = 1. That is, they consistently express maximal
certainty that “the green line of the same length as line
A” is a false statement.
It should be noted that in the experiments, Asch never
assigned values of susceptibility λi, and resilience φi
to the individuals because the quantitatively measured
data by Asch was the number of incorrect answers over
12 iterations per group, and the behaviour of the indi-
vidual being tested. However, based on his written de-
scription of individuals (including excerpts of the inter-
views), it was clear to the authors of this paper what
the approximate range of values of the parameters λi, φi
should be for each type of individual. (Some of these
descriptions and excerpts will be provided immediately
below). Also, the experiments did not attempt to de-
termine the influence matrix W (at the time, influence
network theory in the sense of DeGroot etc. had not yet
6 In this section, we refer to yi, yˆi as beliefs, as the variables
represent individual i’s certainty on an issue that is provably
true or false. As noted in Section 2, our model is general
enough to cover both subjective and intellective topics.
been developed). The qualitative observations made in
this section are invariant to the weights wij , and focus
is instead placed on examining Asch’s experimental re-
sults from the perspective of our model. In the follow-
ing Section 4.2, the impact of W (and in particular the
weight w11), and parameters φ1 and λ1, are shown using
analytic calculations.
4.1 Types of Individuals
Asch observed three broad types of individuals. In par-
ticular, he divided the test individuals as: (i) indepen-
dent individuals, (ii) yielding individuals with distortion
of judgment, and (iii) yielding individuals with distor-
tion of action. The assigned values for the parameters
λ1 and φ1 for each type of individual are summarised in
Table. 1. Values of φ1, λ1 in this neighbourhood gener-
ate responses that are qualitatively the same at a high
level; the differences lie in the exact values of the final
opinions.
Independent individuals can be divided further into dif-
ferent subgroups depending on the reasoning behind
their independence, but this will not be considered be-
cause we focus only on the final outcome or observed
result and not the reasons for independence. Asch iden-
tified an independent individual as someone who was
strongly confident that A was correct. This individual
did not change his expressed belief, i.e. did not yield to
the confederates’ unanimous declaration that A was in-
correct, despite the confederates insistently questioning
the individual. Asch’s descriptions indicate that the test
individual is extremely stubborn (i.e. closed to influence)
and confident his belief is correct, and is resilient to the
group pressure. It is then obvious that one would as-
sign to such individuals values of λ1 close to zero and φ1
close to one. With the framing of the experiments given
above, our model would be said to accurately capture an
independent individual if test individual 1 with param-
eter values of λ1 close to zero and φ1 close to one, has
final beliefs yˆ∗1 , y
∗
1 ≈ 1.
Asch also identified yielding individuals, who could be
divided into two groups. Those who experienced a distor-
tion of judgment/perception either (i) lacked confidence,
assumed the group was correct and thus concluded A
was incorrect, or (ii) did not realise he had been influ-
enced by the group at all and changed his private belief
to be certain that A was incorrect. This indicates that
the individual is open to influence (i.e. not stubborn in
y1(0) = 1) and is highly affected by the group pressure
(i.e. not resilient). One concludes that for such individ-
uals λ1 is likely to be close to one, and φ1 to be close to
zero. As shown in the sequel, it turns out that the value
of φ1 plays only a minor role for such an individual be-
cause he is already extremely susceptible to influence.
For our model to accurately capture such an individual,
then for λ1 close to one, and φ1 close to zero, one expects
y∗1 , yˆ
∗
1 ≈ 0.
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Table 1
Types of test individuals and their susceptibility and re-
silience parameters
λ1 φ1
Independent low high
Yielding, judgment distortion high any
Yielding, action distortion low low
Other yielding individuals experienced a distortion of ac-
tion. This type of individual, on being interviewed (and
before being informed of the true nature of the experi-
ment) stated that he remained privately certain that A
was the correct answer, but suppressed his observations
as to not publicly generate friction with the group. Such
an individual has full awareness of the difference between
the truth and the majority’s position. This individual is
closed to influence (i.e. stubborn) but not resilient, and
it is predicted that such individuals will have λ1 and φ1
both close to zero. If our model were to accurately cap-
ture such an individual, then the final beliefs would be
expected to be y∗1 ≈ 1 and yˆ∗1 ≈ 0.
4.2 Theoretical Analysis
This section will present theoretical calculations of
Asch’s experiments in the framework of the our model,
showing how y1, yˆ1 vary with W , λ1 ∈ [0, 1] and
φ1 ∈ [0, 1]. Analysis will be conducted for n ≥ 2,
to investigate the effects of the majority size on the
belief evolution. We make the mild assumption that
w11 ∈ (0, 1), which implies that individual 1 considers
his/her own private belief during the discussions.
Because λi = 0 and φi = 1 for all i = 2, . . . , n, one
concludes from Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) that yi(t) = yˆi(t) = 0
for all t. With y(0) = [1, 0, . . . , 0]>, it follows that test
individual 1’s belief evolves as[
y1(t+ 1)
yˆ1(t)
]
= V
[
y1(t)
yˆ1(t− 1)
]
+
[
1− λ1
0
]
. (11)
where
V =
[
λ1w11 0
φ1
1
n (1− φ1)
]
. (12)
From the fact that n ≥ 2, λ1 ∈ [0, 1], w11 ∈ (0, 1), and
φ1 ∈ [0, 1], it follows that V has eigenvalues inside the
unit circle and thus the system in Eq. (11) converges
to limit exponentially fast. Straightforward calculations
show that this limit is given by
lim
t→∞ y1(t) , y
∗
1 =
1− λ1
1− λ1w11 (13)
lim
t→∞ yˆ1(t) , yˆ
∗
1 =
nφ1
n− 1 + φ1 y
∗
1 . (14)
From this, one concludes that the test subject’s final pri-
vate belief is dependent on his level of stubbornness in
believing that A is the correct answer, i.e. λ1, and on
his self-weight w11, i.e. how much he trusts his own be-
lief relative to the others in the group. Interestingly, y∗1
does not depend on individual 1’s resilience φ1, though
it must be noted that this is a special case when the
other individuals are all confederates. In general net-
works beyond the Asch framework, y∗1 will depend not
only on φ1, but also the other φi. For simplicity, consider
a natural selection of wii = 1− λi [28]. As a result, one
obtains that y∗1 = (1 − λ1)/(1 − λ1(1 − λ1)). Examina-
tion of the function f(λ1) = (1− λ1)/(1− λ1(1− λ1)),
for λ1 ∈ [0, 1], reveals how the test subject’s final pri-
vate belief changes as a function of his openness to influ-
ence; the function f(λ1) is plotted in Fig. 5. Notice that
f(λ1) = (1−λ1)/(1−λ1(1−λ1)) ≥ 1−λ1 for λ1 ∈ [0, 1]
with equality if and only if λ1 = {0, 1}. This implies
that the test individual’s final y∗1 will always be greater
than his stubbornness 1 − λ1, except if he has λ1 = 0
(maximally stubborn) or λ1 = 1 (maximally open to in-
fluence).
Next, consider the final expressed belief, which is given
as yˆ∗1 =
nφ1
n−1+φ1 y
∗
1 . The relative closeness of yˆ
∗
1 to y
∗
1 ,
as measured by yˆ∗1/y
∗
1 , is determined by n and φ1. De-
fine g(φ1, n) =
nφ1
n−1+φ1 . The function g(φ1, n) is plotted
in Fig. 6. Observe that g(φ1, n) ≥ φ1 for any n, for all
φ1 ∈ [0, 1], and with equality if and only if φ1 = {0, 1}.
This implies that the test individual’s final expressed
belief will always be closer to his final private belief
than his resilience level. Most interestingly, observe that
g(φ1, n) → φ1 from above, as n → ∞, but the differ-
ence between g(φ1, n) and φ1 when going from n = 2 to
n = 2 × 2 = 4 is much greater than the differences go-
ing from n = 4 to n = 4 × 2 = 8. This may explain the
observation in [13] that increasing the majority size did
not produce a correspondingly larger distortion effect
beyond majorities of three to four individuals, at least
for test individuals with low λ1. That is, an increase in
n does not produce a matching increase in distortion of
the final expressed opinion from the final private opin-
ion, represented as yˆ∗1/y
∗
1 = g(φ1, n)→ 1 as n→∞.
Also of note is that for individuals with λ1 close to one,
y∗1 is already close to zero, and bounds yˆ
∗
1 from above.
The magnitude of the difference, |y∗1 − yˆ∗1 |, only changes
slightly as φ1 is varied, which indicates that for individ-
uals who yielded with distortion of judgment, the value
of φ1 plays only a minor role in the determining the
absolute (as opposed to relative) difference between ex-
pressed and private beliefs. This is in contrast to indi-
viduals with low susceptibility, where the behaviour of
an individual can vary significantly by varying φ1 from
1 to 0.
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Fig. 5. The function f(λ1) and 1 − λ1 plotted
against λ1. The analytical calculations show that
y∗1 = f(λ1), and thus the red line represents
individual 1’s final private belief as a function of
his susceptibility to influence.
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Fig. 6. The function g(φ1, n), with n = 2, 4, 8,
plotted against φ1. The analytical calculations
show that yˆ∗1 = g(φ1, n)y
∗
1 , and thus the plot
shows how the test individual’s final expressed
opinion is changed from his final private opinion
by his resilience φ1, and by n.
4.3 Simulations
The Asch experiments are simulated using the proposed
model. An arbitrary W is generated with weights wij
sampled randomly from a uniform distribution and nor-
malised to ensure
∑n
j=1 wij = 1. The other parameters
are described in the third paragraph of Section 4. In the
following plots of Fig. 7a, 7b and 7c, the values of λ1
and φ1 are given. The red lines correspond to test indi-
vidual 1, with the solid line showing private belief y1(t)
and the dotted line showing expressed belief yˆ1(t). The
blue line represents the confederates k = 2, . . . , 8, who
have yk(t) = yˆk(t) = 0 for all t.
Figure 7a shows the evolution of beliefs when the test
individual is independent. It can be seen that both the
private and expressed beliefs of v1 are largely unaffected
by the confederates’ unanimous expressed belief and the
pressure exerted by the group. Note that yˆ∗1 < y
∗
1 , which
is also reported in [13]; despite expressing his belief that
A is the correct answer, one independent test individual
stated “You’re probably right, but you may be wrong!”,
which might be seen as a concession towards the major-
ity belief. There is also a small shift away from maximal
certainty of yi = 1, with y
∗
1 ≈ 0.93; in [13], one indepen-
dent test individual stated
I would follow my own view, though part of my reason
would tell me that I might be wrong.
Figure 7b shows the belief evolution of a yielding test
individual who, under group pressure, exhibits distor-
tion of judgment/perception. The figure shows that both
y∗1 and yˆ
∗
1 are heavily influenced by the group pressure,
and thus individual 1 is no longer privately certain that
A is the correct answer. In other words, this individ-
ual is highly susceptible to interpersonal influence, and
even his private view becomes affected by the majority.
Of great interest is the evolution of beliefs observed in
Fig. 7c, which involves an experiment with a yielding
test individual exhibiting distortion of action. Accord-
ing to Asch, Individual 1
yields because of an overmastering need to not appear
different or inferior to others, because of an inability
to tolerate the appearance of defectiveness in the eyes
of the group ˜[13].
In other words v1’s expressed belief y
∗
1 is heavily dis-
torted by the pressure to conform to the majority. How-
ever, this individual is still able to “conclude that they
[themselves] are not wrong” [13], i.e. y∗i ≈ 0.93.
Other simulations with values of λ1, φ1 in the neigh-
bourhood of those used also display similar behaviour
as shown in Fig. 7a to 7b, indicating a robust ability
for our model to capture Asch’s experiments is an in-
trinsic property of the model, and rather than resulting
from careful reverse engineering. All three types of indi-
vidual behaviours can be predicted by our model using
pairs of parameters λi, φi, providing a measure of valida-
tion for our model. At the same time, we have provided
an agent-based model explanation of the empirical find-
ings of Asch’s experiments; it might now be possible to
analyse the many subsequent works derived from Asch
can be analysed common framework, whereas existing
static models of conformity are tied to specific empiri-
cal data (see the Introduction). The Friedkin–Johnsen
model has also been applied to the Asch experiments
[30], but (unsurprisingly) was not able to capture all of
the types of individuals reported because the Friedkin–
Johnsen model does not assume that each individual has
a separate private and expressed belief.
4.4 Threshold Variant and Asch’s Second Experiments
The simulations above assumed that the individuals ex-
press a continuous real-valued beliefs yˆi(t), whereas it is
perhaps more appropriate to set yˆi(t) as a binary vari-
able, with yˆi(t) = 1 and yˆi(t) = 0 denoting individual i
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(a) An independent individual, with λ1 =
0.1, φ1 = 0.9.
(b) A yielding individual with distortion
of judgment, with λ1 = 0.9, φ1 = 0.1.
(c) A yielding individual with distortion
of action, with λ1 = 0.1, φ1 = 0.1.
Fig. 7. Fig. 7a, 7c, and 7b show the evolution of beliefs for all three types of reactions recorded by Asch, as they appear in our
model. The red solid and dotted line denote the private and expressed belief, respectively, of the test individual 1 (i.e. y1(t)
and yˆ1(t)). The blue line is the belief of the unanimous confederate group, who express a belief of yˆi(t) = 0.
picking A and not picking A as the correct answer. The
proposed model can be modified to accommodate situa-
tions where the expressed variable denotes an action, or
decision by replacing Eq. (2) with
yˆi(t) = σi (φiyi(t) + (1− φi)yˆi,lavg(t− 1)) , (15)
where σi(x) : [0, 1]→ {0, 1} is a threshold function sat-
isfying σi(x) = 0 if x ∈ [0, τi] and σi(x) = 1 if x ∈ (τi, 1],
for some threshold value τi ∈ (0, 1). Applying the thresh-
old variant of the model with τi = 0.5 yields no quali-
tative difference for the simulations in Section 4.3. That
is, pairs of parameter values λ1, φ1 which in the original
model were associated with an independent, distortion
of action, or distortion of judgment individual (Table 1)
were almost always also associated with the same type
of individual in the threshold model.
4.4.1 Calculations
Because of the highly specialised setup for the Asch ex-
periments, it turns out that one can theoretically cal-
culate the final beliefs of test individual 1 even under
the threshold model. This would not be the case for the
threshold model in general scenarios. In fact, it is unclear
if the threshold model will always converge in a general
setting, especially if individuals update synchronously.
We perform calculations for Asch’s experiments (Sec-
tion 4). First, we remark that the private opinion dynam-
ics y1(t) of test individual 1 is unchanged in the thresh-
old model when compared to the original model, since
the expressed beliefs of all of individual 1’s neighbours
are stationary. Thus, limt→∞ y1(t) , y∗1 = 1−λ11−λ1w11 as
in the original model calculations in Section 4.2.
One can then consider y1(t) as an input to Eq. (15). It
follows that yˆ1(t) converges. In particular, and assuming
global public opinion is used, then limt→∞ yˆ1(t) , yˆ∗1 =
1 if φ1y
∗
1 +(1−φ1) 1n ≥ τ1 and yˆ∗1 = 0 if φ1y∗1 < τ1. There
is a small interval region τ1 ∈
(
φ1y
∗
1 , φ1y
∗
1 + (1− φ1) 1n
)
of width (1 − φ1)/n where yˆ∗1 depends on the initial
condition yˆ1(0).
4.4.2 Asch’s Second Experiments
Asch conducted several variations to the original experi-
ments, as reported in [13,42]. In one particular variation,
one confederate also told a priori to select the correct
answer; the frequency of individuals showing distortion
of action or distortion of judgment decreased dramati-
cally. We now frame this variation of the experiment in
our model’s framework, and call it Asch’s Second Exper-
iment for convenience. The parameter matrix W , and
parameters λi and φi, i = 1, . . . , 8 are unchanged from
the first experiment described in Section 4. The setup
of individual 1 is also the same. However, different from
Section 4, the n − 1 confederates’ beliefs are now set
to be y2(0) = yˆ2(0) = 1, and yi(0) = yˆi(0) = 0 for
i = 3, . . . , n. It should be noted that theoretical calcula-
tions of the final private and expressed beliefs of individ-
ual 1 can also be completed, following the same method
as in Section 4.4.1.
4.4.3 Simulations
We now provide simulations for Asch’s Second Experi-
ment, using both the original model proposed in Eq. (2),
and the threshold model in Eq. (15).
Case 1: The behaviour of individuals with high φ1 and
low λi (independent individuals in Asch’s First Experi-
ment) are the same, qualitatively, when comparing the
original model and the threshold model. We omit the
simulation results for such individuals.
Case 2: Next, we simulate a test individual that has low
φ1 and low λi (in Asch’s First Experiment, these indi-
viduals were said to show distortion of action). Fig. 8a
and 8b show a test individual with λ1 = 0.1, φ1 = 0.1,
for the original and threshold model, respectively.
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Case 3: Last, we simulate a test individual that has low
φ1 and high λi (in the original Asch setup, these individ-
uals were said to show distortion of judgment). Fig. 9a
and 9b show a test individual with λ1 = 0.9, φ1 = 0.1, for
the original and threshold model, respectively. Finally,
Fig. 10 shows Case 4, which simulates a test individual
with the same parameter set of λ1 = 0.9, φ1 = 0.1, but
with the threshold changed from τ1 = 0.5 to τ1 = 0.6.
Whether the original model or the threshold model is
used, it can been seen that introduction of an actor (con-
federate) telling the truth has a major impact on the
belief evolution of the test individual in Case 2 and 3
(compare Fig. 7c with Fig. 8a and 8b, and Fig. 7b with
Fig. 9a, 9b and 10). The impact is significantly more
pronounced under the threshold model, such that a test
individual with λ1 = 0.9, φ1 = 0.1 and τi = 0.5 (Case
3) will still pick the correct answer when another ac-
tor tells the truth. When the threshold is adjusted to
τi = 0.6 (Case 4), the test individual picks the wrong
answer along with the confederates.
5 Conclusions
We have proposed a novel agent-based model of opin-
ion evolution on interpersonal influence networks, where
each individual has separate expressed and private opin-
ions that evolve in a coupled manner. Conditions on the
network and the values of susceptibility and resilience
for the individuals were established for ensuring that the
opinions converged exponentially fast to a steady-state
of persistent disagreement. Further analysis of the fi-
nal opinion values yielded semi-quantitative conclusions
that led to insightful social interpretations, including the
conditions that lead to a discrepancy between the ex-
pressed and private opinions of an individual. We then
used the model to study Asch’s experiments [13], show-
ing that all 3 types of reactions from the test individual
could be captured within our framework. A number of
interesting future directions can be considered. Prelim-
inary simulations show that our model can also capture
pluralistic ignorance, with network structure and place-
ment of extremist nodes having a significant effect on
the observed phenomena. Clearly the threshold model
in Section 4.4 requires further study, and one could also
consider the model in a continuous-time setting, or with
asynchronous updating, or both.
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A Preliminaries
In this section, we record some definitions, and notations
to be used in the proofs of the main results. A square
matrixA ≥ 0 is primitive if there exists k ∈ N such that
Ak > 0 [34, Definition 1.12]. A graph G[A] is strongly
connected and aperiodic if and only ifA is primitive, i.e.
∃k ∈ N such thatAk is a positive matrix [34, Proposition
1.35]. We denote the ith canonical base unit vector of Rn
as ei. The spectral radius of a matrixA ∈ Rn×n is given
by ρ(A).
Lemma 1 If A ∈ Rn×n is row-substochastic and irre-
ducible, then ρ(A) < 1.
Proof: This lemma is an immediate consequence of [43,
Lemma 2.8]. 2
A.1 Performance Function and Ergodicity Coefficient
In order to analyse the disagreement among the opinions
at steady state, we introduce a performance function and
a coefficient of ergodicity. For a vector x ∈ Rn, define
the performance function V (x) : Rn 7→ R as
V (x) = max
i∈{1,...,n}
xi − min
j∈{1,...,n}
xj , (A.1)
In context, V (y) measures the “level of disagreement”
in the vector of opinions y(t), and consensus of opinions,
i.e. y(t) = α1n, α ∈ R, is reached if and only if V (y(t)) =
0. Next consider the following coefficient of ergodicity,
τ(A) for a row-stochastic matrixA ∈ Rn×n, defined [44]
as
τ (A) = 1− min
i,j∈{1,...,n}
n∑
s=1
min{ais, ajs}. (A.2)
This coefficient of ergodicity satisfies 0 ≤ τ(A) ≤ 1, and
τ(A) = 0 if and only if A = 1nz
> for some z ≥ 0.
Importantly, there holds τ(A) < 1 if A > 0. Also, there
holds V (Ax) ≤ τ(A)V (x) (see [44])
A.2 Supporting Lemmas
Two lemmas are introduced to establish several proper-
ties of P and (I2n − P )−1, which will be used to help
prove the main results.
Lemma 2 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then, P
given in Eq. (5) is nonnegative, the graph G[P ] is strongly
connected and aperiodic, and there holds ρ(P ) < 1.
Lemma 3 Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. With P
given in Eq. (5), define Q as
Q =
[
Q11 Q12
Q21 Q22
]
=
[
In − P 11 −P 12
−P 21 In − P 22
]
.
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Then, Q11,Q22 are nonsingular, and Q
−1 > 0 is
Q−1 =
[
A B
C D
]
, (A.3)
where A = (Q11 − Q12Q−122 Q21)−1, D = (Q22 −
Q21Q
−1
11 Q12)
−1, B = −Q−111 Q12D, C = −Q−122 Q21A.
Moreover, R = A(In − Λ) and S = −Q−122 Q21 are
invertible, positive row-stochastic matrices.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 2
First, we verify that P ≥ 0 by using the fact that W ,
Λ, In −Φ, M are all nonnegative. Next, observe that[
Λ(W˜ + ŴΦ) ΛŴ (In −Φ)M
Φ (In −Φ)M
][
1n
1n
]
=
[
Λ1n
1n
]
because M and W = W˜ + Ŵ are row-stochastic.
Notice that the graph G[P ] = (V, E [P ],P ) has
2n nodes, with V = {1, . . . , 2n}. The node subset
V1 = {v1, . . . , vn} contains node vi which is associ-
ated with individual i’s private opinion yi, i ∈ I. The
node subset V2 = {vn+1, . . . , v2n} contains node vn+i
which is associated with individual i’s expressed opin-
ion yˆi, i ∈ I. Define the following two subgraphs;
G1 = (V1, E [P 11],P 11) and G2 = (V2, E [P 22],P 22). The
edge set of G[P ] can be divided as follows
E11 = E
[
P 11 0n×n
0n×n 0n×n
]
, E12 = E
[
0n×n P 12
0n×n 0n×n
]
,
E21 = E
[
0n×n 0n×n
P 21 0n×n
]
, E22 = E
[
0n×n 0n×n
0n×n P 22
]
,
In other words, E11 contains only edges between nodes
in V1 and E22 contains only edges between nodes in V2.
The edge set E12 contains only edges from nodes in V2 to
nodes in V1, while the edge set E21 contains only edges
from nodes in V1 to nodes in V2. Clearly E [P ] = E11 ∪
E12∪E21∪E22. It will now be shown that G[P ] is strongly
connected and aperiodic, implies that P is primitive.
Since the diagonal entries of Λ,Φ are strictly posi-
tive, it is obvious that P 11 = Λ(W˜ + ŴΦ) ∼ W .
Because G[W ] is strongly connected and aperiodic, it
follows that G1 is strongly connected and aperiodic.
Similarly, the edges of G2 are E [P 22]. Because In − Φ
has strictly positive diagonal entries, one concludes that
P 22 = (In −Φ)M ∼ G[M ] ∼ G[W ], i.e. G2 is strongly
connected and aperiodic. Since G1 and G2 are both, sep-
arately, strongly connected, then if there exists 1) an
edge from any node in V1 to any node V2, and 2) an edge
from any node in V2 to any node in V1, one can conclude
that the graph G[P ] is strongly connected. It suffices
to show that E12 6= ∅ and E21 6= ∅. Since P 21 = Φ
has strictly positive diagonal entries, this proves that
E12 6= ∅. From the fact that In −Φ has strictly positive
diagonal entries, and because Ŵ is irreducible, it fol-
lows that P 12 = ΛŴ (In −Φ)M 6= 0n×n. This shows
that E21 6= ∅.
It has therefore been proved that G[P ] is strongly
connected and aperiodic, which also proves that P is
irreducible. Since λi < 1 ∀ i, P is row-substochastic,
Lemma 1 establishes that ρ(P ) < 1. This completes the
proof. 
B.2 Proof of Lemma 3
Lemma 2 showed that G[P ] is strongly connected and
aperiodic, which implies that P is primitive. Since
Q−1 = (I2n − P )−1 ans ρ(P ) < 1, the Neumann series
yields Q−1 =
∑∞
k=0P
k > 0. Next, it will be shown
Q11, Q22 and D = Q11 − Q12Q−122 Q21 are all invert-
ible, which will allow Q−1 to be expressed in the form
of Eq. (A.3) by use of [45, Proposition 2.8.7, pg. 108–
109]. Under Assumption 1, G1[P 11] and G2[P 22] are
both strongly connected and aperiodic; Lemma 1 states
that ρ(P 11), ρ(P 22) < 1. Since Q11 = In − P 11 and
Q22 = In − P 22, the same method as above can be
used to prove that Q11,Q22 are invertible, and satisfy
Q−111 ,Q
−1
22 > 0.
In order to prove that D is invertible, we first establish
some properties ofS = −Q−122 Q21. SinceQ−122 > 0, it fol-
lows from the fact that Φ = diag(φi) is a positive diago-
nal matrix, that S = Q−122 Φ > 0. To prove that S is row-
stochastic, first note that det(S) = det(Q−122 ) det(Φ) 6=
0 (we have φi ∈ (0, 1),∀ i ⇒ det(Φ) 6= 0). Since
(AB)−1 = B−1A−1, observe that
S =
(
Φ−1 −Φ−1(In −Φ)M
)−1
. (B.1)
From Eq. (B.1), verify that S−11n = 1n, which implies
SS−11n = S1n ⇔ S1n = 1n, i.e. S is row-stochastic.
We now turn to proving thatD is invertible. Notice that
S, −Q12 = P 12, and Λ(W˜ + ŴΦ) are all nonnegative.
We write D = In − U where U = P 11 + P 12S ≥ 0.
Observe that U1n = P 111n +
(
ΛŴ (In −Φ)
)
1n =
Λ1n because (Ŵ + W˜ )1n = 1n. In other words, the
ith row of U sums to λi < 1 (see Assumption 1), which
implies that ‖U‖∞ < 1 ⇒ ρ(U) < 1. Because it was
shown in the proof of Lemma 2 that G[P 11] is strongly
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connected and aperiodic, it is straightforward to show
that G[U ] is also strongly connected and aperiodic. It
follows that U is primitive, which implies that D−1 > 0
from the Neumann series D−1 =
∑∞
k=0U
k. Thus, R =
D−1(In−Λ) > 0, because In−Λ is a positive diagonal
matrix. Finally, one can verify that R is row-stochastic
with the following computation: D1n = (In −U)1n =
(In − Λ)1n ⇒ R1n = D−1(In − Λ)1n = D−1D1n =
1n. This completes the proof. 
B.3 Proof of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
Proof of Theorem 1: Lemma 2 established that the time-
invariant matrix P satisfies ρ(P ) < 1. Standard lin-
ear systems theory [46] is used to conclude that the lin-
ear, time-invariant system Eq. (4), with constant input[
((In −Λ)y(0))>, 0>n
]>
, converges exponentially fast
to[
limt→∞ y(t)
limt→∞ yˆ(t)
]
,
[
y∗
yˆ∗
]
= (I2n − P )−1
[
(In −Λ)y(0)
0n
]
= Q−1
[
(In −Λ)y(0)
0n
]
.
(B.2)
Having calculated the form of Q−1 in Eq. (A.3), it is
straightforward to verify that y∗ = Ry(0) and yˆ∗ =
SRy(0) = Sy∗. Here, the definitions of R and S are
given in Lemma 3, which also proved their positivity and
row-stochasticity. This completes the proof. 2
Proof of Corollary 1: The assumption that Λ = In
implies that P is nonnegative and row-stochastic. The
proof of Lemma 2 established that G[P ] is strongly con-
nected and aperiodic, and this remains unchanged when
Λ = In. Standard results on the DeGroot model [1] then
imply that consensus is achieved exponentially fast, i.e.
limt→∞ y(t) = yˆ(t) = α1n for some α ∈ R. 2
B.4 Proof of Theorem 2
If y(0) = α1n, for some α ∈ R (i.e. the initial private
opinions are at a consensus), then y∗ = yˆ∗ = α1n be-
causeR andS are row-stochastic. In what follows, it will
be proved that if the initial private opinions are not at
a consensus, then there is disagreement at steady state.
First, we establish y∗min 6= y∗max. Note that V (y∗) = 0
if and only if y∗ = β1n, for some β ∈ R. Next, observe
that y∗ = β1n if and only if Ry(0) = β1n, for some
β ∈ R. Note that R is invertible, because it is the prod-
uct of two invertible matrices (see Lemma 3). Moreover,
because R is row-stochastic, there holds R1n = 1n ⇔
R−1R1n = R−11n ⇔ R−11n = 1n. Thus, premulti-
plying by R−1 on both sides of Ry(0) = β1n yields
y(0) = βR−11n = β1n. In other words, a consensus of
the final private opinions, y∗ = β1n, occurs if and only
if the initial private opinions are at a consensus. Recall-
ing the theorem hypothesis that y(0) 6= α1n, for some
α ∈ R, it follows that y∗ is not at a consensus. Thus,
y∗min 6= y∗max as claimed.
Next, the inequalities Eq. (9a) and Eq. (9b) are proved.
Since R,S > 0 are row-stochastic, τ(R), τ(S) < 1. Be-
cause R is invertible, R 6= 1nz> for some z ∈ Rn. This
means that τ(R) > 0 (see below Eq. (A.2)). Similarly,
one can prove that τ(S) > 0. In the above paragraph,
it was shown that if there is no consensus of the ini-
tial private opinions, then V (y∗ = Ry(0)) > 0. By re-
calling that V (Ax) ≤ τ(A)V (x) (see Appendix A.1)
and the above facts, we conclude that 0 < V (y∗ =
Ry(0)) < V (y(0)), which establishes the left hand in-
equality of Eq. (9a) and Eq. (9b). Following steps sim-
ilar to the above, but which are omitted, one can show
that 0 < V (yˆ∗ = Sy∗) < V (y∗), which establishes the
right hand inequality of Eq. (9a) and Eq. (9b), and also
establishes that yˆ∗min 6= yˆ∗max.
Last, it remains to prove that for generic initial con-
ditions, y∗i 6= yˆ∗i . Observe that yˆ∗i = y∗i ⇒ yˆ∗avg =
1>n yˆ
∗/n. Thus, yˆ∗i = y
∗
i for m specific individuals if
and only if there are m independent equations satisfy-
ing (ei − 1n1n)>y∗ = 0. This implies that yˆ∗ must lie
in an n−m-dimensional subspace of Rn, denoted as D.
From Theorem 1, one has y∗ = RSy(0). It follows that
yˆ∗i = y
∗
i for m specific individuals only if y(0) belongs to
the inverse image (by RS) of D, and the inverse image
has dimension n −m because R,S are invertible. This
completes the proof. 2
B.5 Proof of Corollary 2
Recall the definition of V in Appendix A.1. From The-
orem 1, one has that V (yˆ∗) = V (Sy∗) ≤ τ(S)V (y∗),
which implies that there holds V (yˆ∗)/τ(S) ≤ V (y∗).
Thus, Eq. (10) can be proved by showing that τ(S) ≤
κ(φ). Note that since global public opinion yˆavg is used,
M in Eq. (5) becomes M = n−11n1>n . Recall that Q
−1
22
can be expressed as Q−122 =
∑∞
k=0P 22. Since P 22 =
n−1 (In −Φ) 1n1>n and Q21 = −Φ, we obtain S =
Φ +H where H ,
∑∞
k=1
[
(In −Φ) 1n1
>
n
n
]k
Φ > 0.
Let a = mini,j aij denote the smallest element of a ma-
trix A, and observe that s = h because S = Φ +H has
the same offdiagonal entries as H, and the ith diagonal
entry of S is greater than that of H by φi > 0. Since
S > 0, Eq. (A.2) yields τ(S) ≤ 1 − ns ≤ 1 − nh. We
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now analyse H. For any A ∈ Rn×n, there holds
n−1 (In −Φ) 1n1>nA
=
1
n

(1− φ1)
∑n
j=1 a1j · · · (1− φ1)
∑n
j=1 anj
...
. . .
...
(1− φn)
∑n
j=1 a1j · · · (1− φn)
∑n
j=1 anj
 .
By recursion, we obtain that the (i, j)th entry of
[(In −Φ) 1n1
>
n
n ]
k is given by (1−φi)
nk
γk, where
γk=
[ n∑
p1=1
n∑
p2=1
· · ·
n∑
pk−1=1
(1− φp1)(1− φp2) · · · (1− φpk−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k-1 summation terms
]
This is obtained by recursively using
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aibj =(∑n
i=1 ai
)∑n
j=1 bj =
∑n
i=1 ai
(∑n
j=1 bj
)
. Next, define
Zk = [(In −Φ) 1n1
>
n
n ]
kΦ. From the above, one can show
that the (i, j)th element of Zk is given by zij(k) =
1
nk
(1 − φi)φjγk. It follows that the smallest element of
Zk, denoted by z(k), is bounded as follows
z(k) ≥ 1
nk
(1− φmax)φminγk. (B.3)
Observe that 1 − φi ≥ 1 − φmax,∀ i ⇒
∑n
a=1 1 − φa ≥
n(1− φmax). It follows that
z(k) ≥ 1
n
φmin(1− φmax)k. (B.4)
Since H =
∑∞
k=1Z
k, there holds h ≥ ∑∞k=1 z(k) ≥
φmin(1 − φmax)(nφmax)−1. We can obtain this by not-
ing that for any r ∈ (−1, 1), the geometric series is∑∞
k=0 r
k = 11−r ⇔
∑∞
k=1 r
k = 11−r − 1, and 0 < 1 −
φmax < 1. From τ(S), τ(H) ≤ 1 − nh, and the above
arguments, we obtain τ(S) ≤ 1 − nh = 1 − φminφmax (1 −
φmax) = κ(φ) as in the corollary statement. Since 0 <
φmin/φmax < 1 and 0 < 1 − φmax < 1, one has 0 <
κ(φ) < 1 and thus τ(S) ≤ κ(φ) holds ∀φi ∈ (0, 1). 
Key to the proof is that the coefficient of ergodicity for
S is bounded from above as τ(S) ≤ κ(φ). The tightness
of τ(S) ≤ κ(φ) depends on φmin/φmax: this can be con-
cluded by examining the proof, and noting that the key
inequalities in Eq. (B.3) and Eq. (B.4) involve φmin and
φmax. If φmin/φmax = 1, then τ(S) = κ(φ).
B.6 Proof of Corollary 3
First, verify that S is invertible, and continuously dif-
ferentiable, for all φi ∈ (0, 1). From [45, Fact 10.11.20]
we obtain
∂S(φ)
∂φi
= −S(φ)
(
∂S−1(φ)
∂φi
)
S(φ). (B.5)
Below, the argument φ will be dropped from S(φ) and
S−1(φ) when there is no confusion. Note that ∂Φ
−1
∂φi
=
−φ−2i eie>i . Using Eq. (B.1) and Eq. (B.5), one obtains
∂S(φ)
∂φi
= φ−2i Sei
(
e>i −m>i
)
S, wherem>i is the i
th row
ofM . It suffices to prove the corollary claim, if it can be
shown that the row vector
(
e>i −m>i
)
S has a strictly
positive ith entry and all other entries are strictly nega-
tive. This is because S > 0⇒ Sei > 0. We achieve this
by showing that
(e>i −m>i )Sei > 0 (B.6)
(e>i −m>i )Sej < 0 , ∀ j 6= i. (B.7)
Observe the following useful quantity:
e>i S
−1 = e>i
(
Φ−1 −Φ−1(In −Φ)M
)
= φ−1i e
>
i − (φ−1i − 1)m>i . (B.8)
Postmultiplying by S on both sides of Eq. (B.8) yields
e>i = φ
−1
i e
>
i S−(φ−1i −1)m>i S. Rearranging this yields
e>i S = φie
>
i + (1− φi)m>i S (B.9)
m>i S = (1− φi)−1
(
e>i S − φie>i
)
. (B.10)
By using the equality of Eq. (B.9) for substitution, ob-
serve that the left hand side of Eq. (B.7) is
(e>i S −m>i S)ej
=
(
φie
>
i + (1− φi)m>i S −m>i S
)
ej = −φim>i Sej ,
because e>i ej = 0 for any j 6= i. Note that m>i Sej > 0
because M being irreducible implies m>i 6= 0>n . Thus,
−φim>i Sej/n < 0, which proves Eq. (B.7). Substituting
the equality in Eq. (B.10), observe that the left hand
side of Eq. (B.6) is
(e>i S −m>i S)ei = e>i Sei −
1
1− φi
(
e>i Sei − φie>i ei
)
=
φi
1− φi
(
1− e>i Sei
)
> 0. (B.11)
The inequality is obtained by observing that 1) φi ∈
(0, 1)⇒ φi/(1− φi) > 0, and 2) 1− e>i Sei > 0 because
0 < e>i Sei = sii < 1. This proves Eq. (B.6). 2
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